The Limits of Science
A couple of somewhat-related items have crossed my path today. They deal with an old favorite topic of this group, on which we have had some highly profitable discussions in the past. My own views on this issue have been significantly modified by discussions on this blog.
First, via Pharyngula via Panda's Thumb, I was made aware of a Senate resolution in Tennessee sponsored by Senator Raymond Finney. The full text of the resolution is fascinating, but it basically asks a question of the state department of education: "Is the Universe ... created through purposeful, intelligent design ...?" If yes, it asks, then why aren't we teaching that in our schools? If maybe, it asks, then why aren't we teaching the possibility as an alternative theory of origins in our schools? If not, then... well, at that point the resolution just gets snarky.
I'm going to answer this question under the presumption that "maybe" is the expected answer. Science is not in the business of disproving God, and science educators are not (or should not be) in the business of rejecting the existence of an intelligent designer... so, it comes back as a maybe. Here's where the Tennessee resolution gets on really shaky ground, in my opinion.
If the answer to Question 1 is "This question cannot be proved or disproved," please answer Question 3:
(3) Since it cannot be determined whether the Universe, including human beings, is created by a Supreme Being (a Creator), why is creationism not taught as an alternative concept, explanation, or theory, along with the theory of evolution in Tennessee public schools?
The absurdity of this statement can most easily be demonstrated by replacing the reference to the Creator with nearly anything else: "Since it cannot be determined whether the Universe, including human beings, is the illegitimate offspring of aliens from Mars and Jupiter, why is that theory not taught...." You get the idea.
For intelligent design to deserve to be taught in science classrooms, it has to do much more than demonstrate that it can't be proved wrong. It has to pass a more rigorous test than theoretical possibility. Rather we need to ask if there is reason, from science, to consider the existence of an intelligent designer probable or likely. To the extent that science is able to speak to that question, it would be appropriate to include the information in a science classroom... beyond that, it would be highly inappropriate.
I would also add one very important point, where the Tennessee resolution goes very wrong. It may be possible for science to recognize that naturalism (which is as far as science can see) is insufficient for providing reasonable explanations of certain phenomena. It is possible for naturalistic science to say: "Based on what we can see now, the most likely explanation for what we see here is something outside of naturalistic science". However, there is no way that science can possibly do anything to guess at, label, or identify any characteristics of what would be outside of its naturalistic sphere of limitations. Finney's resolution, on the other hand, asks the department of education to rule on the existence of "a Supreme Being, that is a Creator". Describing this "Being" in the singular is something science could never purport to know. Describing this outside-of-nature something as a "Being", even, is beyond the ability of science. Describing it as "Supreme", or as worthy of Capital Letters in being named, is well into the realm of religion/philosophy, and out of the realm of naturalistic science.
Considering for a moment my limited possibility... do you believe that it is valid for science to say "Based on what we currently know, the most likely explanation for {something observed} is located outside of naturalistic science"? Is science ever able to say that it is most likely out of its element? Or should science simply stick to the best naturalistic explanation it can offer, however flawed and limited that explanation is? If science should be allowed to recognize that certain things are most plausibly explained by something outside its naturalistic sphere, would such an admission ever be appropriate in a science classroom?
On the other end of the spectrum from the Senator Finneys of the world are the Richard Dawkins' of the world. Now, don't get me wrong... I don't know Senator Finney, but from the little I've seen of the two of them I wouldn't consider Finney to be academically equivalent to Dawkins. However, in their view of the interaction between science and the supernatural, they serve as useful comparison points for discussion. Dawkins, an evolutionary biologist, believes not only that science is incapable of affirming the existence of a Creator, but that belief in a Creator is scientifically irrational. I haven't read any of his books, but he is certainly a popular and influential writer and speaker, proclaiming any form of religion or belief in anything beyond naturalism to be irrational, silly, even despicable.
Today, via The Fire and the Rose, I came across a response to Dawkins' latest book (and his views in general) by philosopher Alvin Plantinga. I found Plantinga's arguments for the most part convincing, though as I said I haven't read Dawkins' books to compare against.
One part in particular interested me, and relates to the earlier part of this discussion. Quoting Plantinga:
Starting in the late Sixties and early Seventies, astrophysicists and others noted that several of the basic physical constants must fall within very narrow limits if there is to be the development of intelligent life—at any rate in a way anything like the way in which we think it actually happened. For example, if the force of gravity were even slightly stronger, all stars would be blue giants; if even slightly weaker, all would be red dwarfs; in neither case could life have developed. The same goes for the weak and strong nuclear forces; if either had been even slightly different, life, at any rate life of the sort we have, could probably not have developed. Equally interesting in this connection is the so-called flatness problem: the existence of life also seems to depend very delicately upon the rate at which the universe is expanding. Thus Stephen Hawking:
reduction of the rate of expansion by one part in 1012 at the time when the temperature of the Universe was 1010 K would have resulted in the Universe's starting to recollapse when its radius was only 1/3000 of the present value and the temperature was still 10,000 K.
That would be much too warm for comfort. Hawking concludes that life is possible only because the universe is expanding at just the rate required to avoid recollapse. At an earlier time, he observes, the fine-tuning had to be even more remarkable:
we know that there has to have been a very close balance between the competing effect of explosive expansion and gravitational contraction which, at the very earliest epoch about which we can even pretend to speak (called the Planck time, 10-43 sec. after the big bang), would have corresponded to the incredible degree of accuracy represented by a deviation in their ratio from unity by only one part in 10 to the sixtieth.
One reaction to these apparent enormous coincidences is to see them as substantiating the theistic claim that the universe has been created by a personal God and as offering the material for a properly restrained theistic argument...
Plantinga goes on to point out Dawkins' response to this evidence. Dawkins, according to Plantinga, hypothesizes the existence of many universes, maybe even infinite universes, enough that the likelihood of one having a compatible set of constants becomes acceptable... which universe would also then develop complex life as we know it. We would be able to recognize and evaluate the unlikely chain of events because we were at the end of it, but the multitude of other universes that did not result in us would be beyond our vision. They would be necessary for us to believe in their existence to explain the otherwise unexplainable practical-impossibility of the universe being perfectly tuned to support life.
Now, it need hardly be mentioned that Dawkins' hypothesis here is nothing close to science. It is not testable, not verifiable, and must be taken on faith just as much as any other religious point of view. I would definitely say that "intelligent design" is just as valid an explanation for the unlikeliness of the precise tuning of the universal constants as "hypothetical multiple universes". I see no reason that the latter should be allowable in a science classroom, if the former should not be.
[For completeness, let me link to an extensive response to this argument for design found here, later updated by the author here. Basically, he lays out alternate explanations (much as Plantinga cites Dawkins doing), and says that these explanations are "at least as good or better" then the non-naturalistic explanations. I can only presume that they are better in his estimation because they are naturalistic. They certainly don't have any better claim to evidential support. He then states that the intelligent design possibility can be disregarded because other equivalent options are available, an argument which seems peculiar to me.]
But, what should a science teacher say when a student asks the honest question, "How did all those universal constants line up so perfectly?" Should the science teacher say, "Science has no good answer for that question; look elsewhere"? Should the science teacher suggest (with careful qualification) various prominent explanations even if they are beyond the strict naturalistic realms of science? Or should the science teacher say, "The best naturalistic explanation is that chance brought these factors together; though it is unthinkably implausible, it is possible, and that's the best scientific answer"?
Let me quickly recap and summarize my thoughts and questions...
* Science cannot speak to specifics outside of the naturalistic realm. This is an important observation that places limits on how we can discuss these things, and particularly how we can address non-naturalistic subjects in science classrooms.
* Science may be right to recognize that in some situations, the best explanation available is one that is not available to science because it is outside the naturalistic realm. I am curious what others think about the propriety of science pointing outside itself for answers (even as it can't clarify the specifics).
* When science does not provide useful answers, but extra-scientific disciplines can provide useful answers, how should the science teacher interact with those issues from a scientific perspective?
I'd love to know what you think.
Mark